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HOUSE PRICE VOLATILITY AND HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS  










Recent household financial models predict that collateral-constrained households are 
more likely to increase debt-financed spending in response to rising house values. 
We augment this model to consider the use of unsecured debt such as credit cards. 
Using household panel data, we consider microeconomic evidence on the behaviour 
of households in the United States and the United Kingdom in response to rising 
house prices. The evidence confirms that previously collateral-constrained 
households in both countries increase their indebtedness more than unconstrained 
households as house prices rose. But whereas United Kingdom households used 
house price gains primarily to refinance existing unsecured debt, United States 
households were more likely to increase their total indebtedness. Our results imply 
that on average households in the United States extract as much as 10% of their 
housing equity gains to fund consumption spending, and suggest that housing wealth 
effects predominantly arise through unbinding liquidity constraints. 
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HOUSE PRICE VOLATILITY AND HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS 
 IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Introduction 
The strong co-movements in house prices and household consumption behaviour in 
several countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, has understandably 
received widespread attention. Table 1 illustrates house price and consumption growth in the 
two countries between 1987 and 2007.   For both countries, consumption growth tracks house 
price growth through the housing market downturn of the early 1990s and recovery during 
the late 1990s.  However Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek (2006) urge caution in interpreting 
such data as evidence of any long run relationship between house price changes and 
consumption levels.
1  Indeed, as Table 1 suggests, from 2000 onwards this relationship 
appeared to detach as consumption growth moderated and house price growth accelerated in 
both countries. 
House price fluctuations may affect consumption through a generalised wealth effect, 
as suggested by Congressional Budget Office (2007):  
“Most analysts believe that an increase in home values permanently increases 
consumer spending in every subsequent year by some fraction of that rise in 
value – the so-called wealth effect.  An increase in the housing wealth of 
households reduces the need for homeowners to save for the future, allowing 
them to spend more than they would otherwise have spent.” [p.1] 
The primary channel through which such a wealth effect operates is by allowing 
households to extract housing equity via mortgage refinancing.  So we might expect to see a 
close relationship between changes in housing wealth, in the growth of debt secured on 
housing wealth, and in consumption spending.  Iacoviello (2004, 2005), among others, argues 
that the relationship between changes in debt-financed consumption and house prices is 
disproportionately large among households that were previously liquidity-constrained: that is, 
whose ability to borrow was limited by the value of their available wealth which could act as 
collateral. In this case, this refinancing channel is particularly important for these ‘collateral-
constrained’ households; a hypothesis that is supported by that Iacoviello’s calibrated models. 
                                          
1  In addition, the co-movement of house prices and consumption spending may be driven by other factors: on 
this see Attanasio and Weber (1994), Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester (2009) and Disney, Gathergood 
and Henley (2008). 3 
 
The present paper estimates the impact of house price movements on housing equity 
withdrawal behaviour in the United States and the United Kingdom in recent years using 
individual household-level panel data. It thereby examines the relationship between 
household indebtedness and ‘shocks’ to house prices.  It finds important differences in the 
responses of households to house price shocks in the two countries.  The results show that a 
significant fraction of collateral constrained home-owning households did indeed respond to 
rising house prices by extracting housing equity via mortgage refinancing, but that this 
behaviour was much more prevalent in the United States than in the United Kingdom.  We 
show that households in the United Kingdom primarily extracted housing equity in order to 
pay-off non-mortgage-secured debts such as credit cards.  By contract, households in the 
United States who also held non-negligible non-mortgage debts instead appeared to utilise 
equity withdrawal to finance additional consumption spending.  
The increase in household indebtedness arising from the recent house price boom 
therefore appears to be very different between the two economies.  We hypothesise that the 
United States behaviour was facilitated by the more rapid growth of the sub-prime mortgage 
market in that country relative to the United Kingdom, which allowed already highly 
leveraged households to draw on marginal housing equity gains.  More generally, the paper 
infers that the stimulus to consumer spending that was provided by house price growth in 
recent years might best be understood as a collateral-based effect rather than a general 
wealth-based effect, but in a world where households can borrow both secured against their 
housing equity and unsecured, thereby augmenting the basic ‘collateral constraint’ model of 
household behaviour. 
The central role of collateral 
Support for the view that house price movements stimulate household consumption 
via collateral effects is evident from aggregate measures of housing equity withdrawal. 
Measures of ‘Housing Equity Withdrawal’ (HEW) attempt to calculate equity extracted from 
the housing stock but not invested in it, such as proceeds from downsizing or cash-out 
mortgage refinancing, although by construction do not perfectly measure equity withdrawn 
for non-housing consumption (see Davey, 2001).  Table 1 also illustrates HEW measures for 
the United Kingdom constructed by the Bank of England and for the United States calculated 
from flow-of-funds data by Kennedy and Greenspan (2007).  By these measures, house price 
growth is strongly correlated with households extracting equity from their homes. The 4 
 
slightly longer series of available HEW estimates for the United Kingdom suggest a close 
correlation with house price growth and the marked increase in HEW by the Kennedy-
Greenspan measure since 1998 correlates with the corresponding housing market boom in the 
United States. 
Despite the correlation between house price growth and equity extraction, 
policymakers have been reluctant to attribute a sizeable part of the aggregate housing–
consumption ‘link’ to collateral effects – a caution reflected by the recent paper by 
Congressional Budget Office (2007) on housing wealth and consumer spending cited earlier. 
This is because aggregate level studies rely on cross-country comparisons of and temporal 
variations in aggregate house price movements, consumption and aggregate equity 
withdrawal measures predicated on differing institutional factors and lending regimes in 
mortgage markets.  The advantage of using household-level panel data is that we are able to 
observe collateral positions, housing equity gains and equity extraction at the individual 
household level, and to exploit cross-sectional variation across households for the two 
economies.  We know of no other study that has utilised household-level panel data, as 
opposed to calibrated models of hypothesised collateral constraints, to examine these issues. 
Using such data, we argue that there is clear evidence for a strong collateral-based 
relationship between house price growth and housing equity extraction which gave rise to 
increased consumer indebtedness, at least in the United States.   
In the standard collateral constraint model without unsecured debt, a household can 
borrow secured against some fraction of its housing wealth.  The budget constraint has a cliff 
non-convexity where the collateral constraint ‘bites’: that is, the maximum that a household 
can consume in any period is its current income and cash-in-hand, plus the expected value (to 
the lender) of the value of its house, discounted at the rate of interest on a loan secured on the 
collateral.  Hence a rise in the house price allows a highly leveraged household to increase its 
consumption up to (or within) the budget constraint augmented by the higher value of the 
collateral.     
If we incorporate the availability of unsecured debt into this mechanism, the 
consumer now faces a non-linear budget constraint: cheaper secured debt can be 
supplemented by the use of more expensive unsecured credit. The unbinding of the collateral 
constraint when house prices rise with secured (mortgage) debt fixed in nominal terms allows 
the household to refinance its debt portfolio.  In this setting, the wealth effect arising from 
this reduction in the average interest rate on the household’s borrowing allows it to increase 5 
 
its consumption spending so that the new equilibrium can involve no use of unsecured debt, 
or a higher proportion of secured debt in its portfolio.  However, the net effect on household 
spending of a general rise in nominal asset values for a previously collateral-constrained 
household, whilst positive, is smaller than in the scenario without unsecured credit.  Indeed 
where, as in practice, there are transactions costs involved in refinancing secured debt, there 
will be a discontinuity at the original kink point in the budget constraint and the household 
may not change its debt structure or debt level at all should the costs of refinancing outweigh 
the gains to be had in reducing the average interest rate of its debt portfolio. Housing 
collateral effects, therefore, are weakened somewhat by the inclusion of unsecured debt. 
2. Data issues 
To examine these issues, we use well-established household panel data sets. For the 
United States, the long-running Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) provides detailed 
individual household level data on aspects of household finances, labour market participation, 
health and demographic data. We utilise the most recent four years of data: 1999, 2001, 2003 
and 2005 which include additional questions on household wealth, including household 
mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. We construct a panel of 1,582 households of working 
age, excluding households where the head of households is retired, self-employed or the 
household is a non-home owner. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the finances of this 
panel of households. Non-mortgage debt includes the value of credit cards and personal 
loans. Mortgage debt is the sum of all outstanding debts secured against property owned by 
the household, including second and third homes. Auto-debt is the value of outstanding 
automobile leases and loans, which we classify separately from secured (mortgage) debt and 
non-mortgage debt. Household financial wealth includes the self-reported value of Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). The household Loan-to-Value Ratio (LVR) is the value of all 
mortgage debt divided by the value of all debt secured against dwellings. Outright owners 
(who owe nothing against their property) are assigned an LVR of zero. 
For the United Kingdom, the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) is an annual 
survey of approximately 10,000 adults in around 5,000 households that has been running 
since 1991, with a question format modelled on the PSID. The 1995, 2000 and 2005 waves 
provide detailed data on household finances in wealth modules similar to those supplemented 
in the PSID. We construct a panel of 1,368 households of working age, excluding households 
where the head of household is retired, self-employed or the household is a non-home owner 6 
 
as before. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2. Non-mortgage debt includes the value 
of credit cards and personal loans plus other forms of unsecured credit – the BHPS question 
is more detailed than the PSID equivalent. Mortgage debt is the sum of all outstanding debt 
secured against property owned by the household, including second and third homes, as for 
the PSID. There is no separate value for loans secured against automobiles, which are far less 
prevalent in the United Kingdom than the United States. Household financial wealth includes 
the self-reported value of Personal Pension Plans (PPPs), similar to IRAs. Hence our 
measures of wealth in both surveys exclude the value of employer-provided pensions and 
pension rights accrued through social security. 
In both samples households vary greatly in their collateral positions. As illustrated in 
Table 3, approximately one fifth of sampled United States households and one third of United 
Kingdom households are outright owners. In both samples, approximately 20% of households 
have LVRs above 0.8 and might be considered as having little or no scope for increasing their 
borrowing secured against housing on their first (= conforming in United States parlance) 
mortgage. The period considered is one of sustained house price increases in both countries, 
and this is reflected in the growth in self-reported house values, which double for households 
in the United States and treble for households in the United Kingdom over the period. On 
average, households in both samples experience substantial falls in LVRs. Increases in the 
average value of mortgage debt are greatly outweighed by increases in housing values over 
the period. Rising house values also contribute to the growth in household net worth, 
illustrated in Table 3. 
Household LVRs typically fall over the life-cycle.  Typically, households purchase 
dwellings when young via mortgage contracts and repay the mortgage principal over the 
course of their working life.  Households often upsize their dwellings and, less typically, 
downsize their dwellings over their lifetime. The majority of high-LVR households who face 
collateral constraints are young, though the potential for older households to extend their 
mortgage lender to high LVRs might be limited by the length of their working life. Table 3 
illustrates the correlation between household age and LVR. The negative correlation is 
somewhat sharper for the U.K. compared to the U.S., with the figure for the U.S. showing a 





High loan-to-value ratios and use of unsecured debt 
Our primary interest is in the household’s acquisition of secured and unsecured debt, 
and how this is affected by house price changes. We first examine the use of unsecured debt: 
in particular testing the hypothesis that it is disproportionately used by households with high 
loan-to-value ratios (LVRs).  As discussed in Section 1, in this case, we might then expect 
such households to utilise rising home values as an opportunity to reduce debt servicing costs 
by substituting less costly secured debt for unsecured debt balances.  Questions about values 
of unsecured debt in both the PSID and BHPS make no distinction between credit card 
balances which are ‘revolved’ as an interest-bearing debt or cleared before interest charges 
are applied. Hence our measure of outstanding balances on unsecured credit, which is 
composed of balances on a range of credit instruments, will overstate the true cost of interest-
bearing unsecured debt.  
We estimate a random effects tobit model with censoring at zero, pooling the four 
waves of PSID observations / 3 waves of BHPS observations in order to examine whether 
households with higher LVRs also hold greater values of unsecured debt. We cannot exploit 
within-household changes in LVRs over time as, by construction, in the relationship we wish 
to test, changes in LVRs are endogenous to changes in unsecured debts. The estimates 
therefore depend heavily on the cross-sectional association between LVRs and unsecured 
debt, and we make no claim to identification.  Instead, the purpose of the estimates is to 
establish that the correlation between the household LVRs and unsecured debt values is not 
readily explained simply by household income, or demographics. Table 4 presents the 
estimates. For both sets of estimates, the coefficient on the LVR is positive and significant at 
the 1% level after we control for demographics. The coefficients on household income and 
age are also positive, as is the coefficient on the value of automobile-related debt owed by the 
households. 
We further expect the relationship between LVRs and unsecured debt values to be 
non-linear, increasing at LVR values close to mortgage lending limits (typically 0.7-0.85 for 
both economies for first / conforming mortgages in the period considered), consistent with 
the idea that households utilise unsecured debt as a substitute for secured debt when they 
reach the ceiling on their use of housing as collateral.  Hence, the tobit model is re-estimated 
using decile LVR splines and marginal effects calculated at each spline, conditional on non-8 
 
censoring and at the means of other variables. Table 5 plots marginal effects for the PSID / 
BHPS samples. The conditional relationship between the LVR and unsecured debt increases 
sharply at LVR values of 0.6-0.7 in both samples, consistent with the idea that household use 
of unsecured debt increases as households approach LVR values close to the limit of 
mortgage lending. This result underpin the proposition that households exhibiting both high 
LVRs and high values of unsecured debts are those most likely to refinance their debt 
portfolio via extending their mortgage debt as house values increase.  This is tested next. 
Mortgage refinancing and household indebtedness 
To estimate the impact of rising house values on household secured debts, we exploit 
household-level changes in house prices, in secured debt and in unsecured debt in the panel. 
The empirical strategy is to regress the change in household secured debt against the change 
in house value and a set of financial, labour market and demographic controls. Three 
econometric issues thereby present themselves. First, while we surmise that households might 
draw on their housing gains by extracting housing equity via increasing mortgage debts, a 
reverse causality might exist whereby households extend their mortgage debt in order to 
finance home improvement work and hence increase their housing value (we exclude home 
movers from the sample – see below). Neither household survey contains comprehensive 
information on home improvement work. Consequently, the growth in housing values is 
instrumented using a local-level house price index. For PSID households, we utilise the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) state-level house price index as an 
instrument for the change in the household’s self-reported house value. For the BHPS we 
construct a similar instrument using a county-level house price index collated by the Halifax 
Bank, as of 2007 the United Kingdom’s largest mortgage lender. The Halifax index tracks 
house values at a finer level of disaggregation (the county) than the United States index (the 
state).  
A second issue is that equity extraction is likely to be correlated with home moving 
activity, which often involves purchases of non-housing durables funded by over-mortgaging. 
As mortgage refinancing involves non-negligible fixed costs (more so in the United States 
than the United Kingdom) households may delay equity extraction until a home move event. 
Changes in mortgage debt for home movers cannot be decomposed in the data into the 
proportion which funds additional housing purchases and the proportion which is used for 
non-housing consumption. This limits inference on the relationship between changing house 9 
 
values and secured debt for households observed to move between waves, so we limit our 
analysis to non-movers. This reduces the sample size to 1381 non-moving PSID households 
observed over the waves (3 changes) and 1158 BHPS households observed over 3 waves (2 
changes). However, across our sample of non-movers the likelihood of moving in the near 
future (and hence likelihood of delaying equity extraction until a moving event) varies 
considerably. Both BHPS and PSID measure moving intentions through a question which 
asks respondents whether they intend to move home in the near future. To control for 
variation in the underlying likelihood of moving across households in our regression, the 
samples of movers and non-movers are pooled to estimate a probit model for whether the 
household moved home between waves based on this moving intentions questions and a set 
of covariates. A predicted probability of moving is then calculated for each household. This 
predicted probability is utilised as an additional regressor in the final regression to control for 
variation in the likelihood of moving and hence in delaying equity extraction. 
Finally, the analytical model sketched out earlier implies that we expect to observe a 
differential relationship between changes in house values and secured debt across households 
dependent upon their initial collateral position. Households which initially exhibit low LVRs 
would not necessarily be expected to respond to rising house values by extending their 
secured debt. Should such households have desired additional borrowing we might expect 
them already to have utilised leverage on their initial housing collateral.  By contrast, 
households with high LVRs can be considered the collateral-constrained group for which we 
might expect a stronger relationship, particularly so among those households who can reduce 
their debt service costs by refinancing outstanding unsecured debts onto their home 
mortgage. This distinction is central to the model of ‘collateral-constrained’ households. 
Hence, in the regression we interact the instrumented change in house value with a series of 
dummy variables which distinguish households by their initial LVR positions, estimating 
different conditional coefficients for households with initially high LVRs compared to the 
rest of the sample. Our definition of a ‘high LVR’ is not precise as we do not observe 
individual-specific collateral constraints, so we present a series of regressions in which this 
high LVR threshold is set at an LVR of 0.9 or 0.8. To implement a similar sample split based 
on outstanding unsecured debt we also utilise dummy variable interactions for threshold 
values of initial unsecured debts. 
Estimates for the United Kingdom from the BHPS are presented in Table 6. In 
Column 1 the coefficient on the (instrumented) change in house value is not significant. 10 
 
Household secured debt is increasing in the growth in household income and negatively 
related to the age of the household, as expected. Other demographic and labour force 
variables are not significant. In Columns 2 and 3 the change in house value is interacted with 
dummy variables for the initial LVR with no significant coefficient on either threshold 
interaction term. In Columns 4 and 5 a further interaction term is included for the initial value 
of unsecured debts held by the household. Here the coefficient on the interaction term 
capturing households with high LVRs plus higher values of unsecured debt is positive, 
sizeable and statistically significant at the 1% level. For households with LVRs above 0.8 and 
unsecured debts about £1,000 an increase in instrumented housing value of £1,000 is 
associated with an increase in secured debt of £310. In the sample 10% of household-
observations fall into this category. No such relationship is evident for households with an 
equivalent level of unsecured debt but lower LVR, or among the other LVR groups as 
identified by the interaction terms. In Column 4 the unsecured debt threshold is increased and 
the coefficient on the interaction also increases. As expected, a significant relationship 
between house value increases and increases in secured debt is only observed for a sub-set of 
the population based on initial collateral position and initial unsecured debt. These results are 
consistent with the story described earlier. 
Estimates for the United States from the PSID presented in Table 7 display a much 
stronger relationship between (instrumented) changes in house values and secured debt. In 
Column 1 the coefficient on the instrumented change in house value is positive and 
significant at the 1% level and implies sampled households increase secured debt by 
approximately 10% of their housing gains. Age, household income and other demographics 
are not statistically significant in this regression, but there is a positive and significant 
conditional relationship between increases in auto-related debts and secured debts. In 
Columns 2 and 3 we again interact changes in instrumented house values with dummy 
variables distinguishing the household’s initial LVR position. Households with initial higher 
LVRs exhibit a stronger relationship between changes in house values and secured debt, 
statistically significantly stronger at the 1% level. Columns 4 and 5 present results for the 
addition of the unsecured debt dummies. The interaction term in Column 4 for the unsecured 
debt threshold dummy variable in Column 4 exhibits a coefficient of 0.74; this implies that 
households with an initial LVR above 0.8 and unsecured debts of over $2,000 (17% of the 
sample observations) increased their secured debts by nearly three-quarters of the increase in 11 
 
house value. Estimates for a higher unsecured debt threshold of $3,000 in Column 5 show a 
similar magnitude of response for a smaller sample (12%) of households. 
Results for both the PSID and BHPS samples show markedly different relationships 
between the growth in mortgage debt and changes in house values for high-LVR and low-
LVR households, more so for the PSID sample than the BHPS sample. Table 8 describes the 
evolution of household finances for high-LVR and low-LVR households in both samples 
over the period considered. In Table 8 the PSID and BHPS samples of household-year-
observations are split by an LVR threshold of 0.7. Approximately one quarter of observations 
in each sample are for household-years with LVRs above 0.7 The evolution of mortgage debt 
for households in the high-LVR group is markedly different compared to that for households 
in the low-LVR group. Among the PSID sample of households exhibiting an LVR in excess 
of 0.7 over the following two-year period the mean increase in mortgage debt is equivalent to 
two-thirds of the gain in house values, compared to an average decrease in mortgage debt 
among the low LVR sample. Households in the high-LVR sample also on average increase 
their unsecured debts and auto-related debts. Hence the increase in mortgage debt appears not 
to be utilised to pay-off non-mortgage debts; rather these households increase their 
indebtedness across the range of secured and unsecured borrowing instruments. The pattern 
on borrowing among the BHPS sample also differs between high-LVR and low-LVR 
households, however high-LVR households increase their mortgage debt by only one-
twentieth of the value of their housing gain. These households also exhibit lower growth in 
unsecured debt compared to the rest of the sample, suggesting that the increase secured debt 
may have been utilised in part to offset accrual of, or pay down, unsecured debts. It is evident 
from these summary statistics that high-LVR PSID households increased their indebtedness 
markedly over the period compared to the rest of the sample, and compared to similarly high-
LVR households in the BHPS sample. The regression estimates in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that 
much of this increase in mortgage debt is attributable to increases in housing values for these 
households. 
4. Discussion 
Why is the mortgage debt of collateral-constrained households in the United States so 
much more responsive to increases in house prices than in the United Kingdom?  One option, 
of course, is that households in the United States are more impatient for consumption. Two 
other possible reasons relate to the structure of mortgage markets in the United States 12 
 
compared to the United Kingdom. First, households in the United States typically hold fixed 
rate mortgages which they choose to refinance at the point of interest rate reset. Fixed fees 
associated with mortgage refinancing can be added to the value of the mortgage debt. This 
would go some way to explaining increases in mortgage debt across all households; however 
the evidence in Table 8 suggests that for low-LVR households outstanding mortgage debt is 
actually falling over the period. Secondly, the summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that 
households in the United States on average hold greater values of unsecured debt and auto-
related debts, hence giving them a greater incentive to substitute secured for unsecured and 
auto-related debts when house prices increase and collateral constraints unbind. However, 
Table 8 indicates that household debt among high-LVR was increasing across secured, 
unsecured and auto-related debts over the period. 
Alternatively, the greater willingness of collateral constrained households in the 
United States to extend their mortgage leverage positions in response to rising house values 
than their counterparts in the United Kingdom might be explained by differential lower 
downside risk to falling house values in the two economies.  No-recourse clauses on   
conforming mortgage loans in the United States protect households from exposure to 
liabilities arising from negative housing equity positions. Households can effectively walk-
away from negative equity and benefit from an immediate wealth gain from relinquishing 
negative housing equity positions. Indeed, Bajari, Chu and Park (2009) find that declining 
home prices are a major factor in explaining increasing default on mortgage loans among 
households in the United States. In contrast, mortgage contracts in the United Kingdom do 
not offer the same option to holders, increasing the potential liabilities to households 
experiencing negative equity.  
Without data on household consumption spending it is not possible to confirm that the 
increases in mortgage debt documented were utilised by households to fund consumption 
spending. Whilst we can present evidence that the households which most aggressively 
increased their mortgage debts also increased their other debts, we do not know whether 
increase mortgage debt was used to fund durable purchases, home improvements or 
consumption spending, or indeed whether households chose to hold additional borrowing as 
cash. However, increased mortgage debt was most likely used to fund some form of 
consumption spending. This being the case, our results suggest that households in the United 
States might have consumed approximately 10% of their housing gains via increasing their 13 
 
mortgage debt, whereas for the United Kingdom this figure is much lower, most likely 
around 3-4% of the gain.  
These results may also go some way to reconciling existing findings on the magnitude 
of housing wealth effects in aggregate and micro-data studies. Previous studies based on  
aggregate data in the United States have found large housing wealth effects in the region of 
0.1 (Case et al., 2005; Carroll et al., 2006). However, studies based on micro-data, which 
have been limited to studies on household savings data, have found much smaller estimates in 
the region of 0-0.03 (Juster et al., 2006; Engelhardt, 1996).  If housing wealth effects 
primarily act through collateral effects on credit-constrained households, and hence are 
observed in increased indebtedness, estimates based on savings data are likely to be small. 
Our implied consumption effect of 0.1 suggests that most of the housing wealth effect can be 
considered a collateral-based effect, and reconciles estimates from micro-data with those 
from aggregate data studies. For the U.K. a recent study by Disney et al., 2009 based on 
household savings data also find very small housing wealth effects. Studies based on 
household consumption data find that consumption is unresponsive to unpredictable changes 
in house prices but responsive to predictable changes in house prices (Campbell and Cocco, 
2006; but see Attanasio et al., 2009). This result is also consistent with our story of housing 
wealth effects primarily occurring through collateral channels.  
5. Conclusion 
Recent versions of the ‘financial accelerator’ model (see Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1999) as applied to households have been formulated on the premise that the 
economy is composed of two types of households: those patient for consumption and those 
impatient for consumption. Impatient ‘spenders’ utilise housing gains as additional collateral 
against which to extend mortgage positions and finance consumption spending. Patient 
‘savers’ benefit from housing wealth effects which lead to much smaller consumption 
response than those exhibited among spender households. This paper has estimate the impact 
of changes in house values on the indebtedness of households in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  It finds that the distinction between spenders and savers made in 
household financial accelerator models may not be far off as a description of the behaviour of 
U.S. households over the past decade. Incorporating unsecured debts into the story, collateral 
constrained households with non-negligible unsecured debts in our sample respond most 
aggressively to house price increases by increasing their mortgage debts, with the most 14 
 
constrained households increasing the value of their mortgage debt equivalent to three-
quarters of the value of their housing gain. This story appears less applicable to the sample 
for the United Kingdom, where the same pattern of responses is found but the magnitudes of 
responses to house price volatility are much lower. Time will tell as to whether household 
behaviour in response to the sharp reversal of house prices from 2007 onwards is consistent 
with these findings for the two economies.  15 
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Table 2: Means of Financial Variables for PSID / BHPS Households 
PSID (financial variables in U.S. dollars, 2001 prices) 
Year  1999 2001  2003  2005 
No. Households  1582  1582 1582  1582
Age 42.3  44.4 46.4  48.34
Income 72,000  83,000 82,000  88,000
Financial Wealth  52,000  58,000 61,000  78,000
Auto-Debt 6,200  6.800 7,100  6,200
Non-Mortgage Debt  5,400  6,200 7,100  8,000
Value all Housing  138,000  169,000 200,000  256,000
Mortgage Debt  65,000  72,000 80,000  90,000
LVR 0.47  0.44 0.42  0.38
BHPS (financial variables in U.K. pounds, 2000 prices) 
Year  1995 2000  2005 
No. Households  1368 1368 1368
Age 40.4 44.9 49.8
Income 24,000 30,000 34,000
Financial Wealth  11,000 13,000 17,000
Non-Mortgage Debt  1,600 2,500 3,500
Value all Housing  75,000 119,000 236,000
Mortgage Debt  33,000 37,000 44,400






















Table 4: Cross-Section LVR and Unsecured Debt 
Specification: 
Random Effects Tobit 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Unsecured Debt  
PSID 
(financial variables in US dollars) 
BHPS  















    9343** 
(1361) 





    0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.03  0.07** 
(0.009) 
0.03 









  -0.02** 
(0.003) 
-0.01  -0.03** 
(0.006) 
-0.12 
Financial Assets Sq 
 
    6.61e-09** 
(1.23e-09) 
3.03e-09  0.00002 
(0.00002) 
8.91e-06 
















-0.68  -2.86* 
(1.17) 
-0.13 




-1493  224 
(261) 
102 
Married = 1 
 
    4687** 
(1741) 







208  216* 
(123) 
108 
































Notes to Table 4: Marginal effects conditional on being uncensored. Marginal effects evaluated at means of 
other characteristics. Predicted value for unsecured debt at means of characteristics is $8400. * = 5% level of 
significance, ** = 1% level of significance. PSID estimates: 2699 censored / 3629 uncensored observations. 
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Δ House Value (£,000s)* 
LVRt-1>0.X* 
Udebtt-1>£Y 
-  -  -     0.31** 
(0.07)  
   0.42** 
(0.06) 
Δ House Value (£,000s)* 
LVRt-1<0.X* 
Udebtt-1>£Y 




Δ Household Income 
(£,000s) 
   0.07** 
(0.03) 
   0.09** 
(0.03) 
   0.09** 
(0.03) 
  0.07** 
(0.03) 
   0.07** 
(0.03) 












Change in L.F. Status 
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(0.21) 
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(0.22) 








































Prob >  F 





















Notes to Table 6: Additional control variables: household income squared, household assets squared, age squared, 
years schooling, degree, smoker, predicted probability of being a non-mover. 2316 observations of household-changes 
(1995-2000, 2000-2005). IV estimates using change in county-level house price index as instrument for change in 
self-reported house value. t-1 refers to variable measured at beginning of period. * = 5% level of significance, ** = 1% 

























Δ House Value ($,000s) 
 
    0.11** 
(0.04) 
- - -  - 
Δ House Value ($,000s)* 
LVRt-1>0.X 
-     0.36** 
(0.13) 
   0.25** 
(0.09) 




Δ House Value ($,000s)* 
LVRt-1<0.X 








Δ House Value ($,000s)* 
LVRt-1>0.X* 
Udebtt-1>$Y 




Δ House Value ($,000s)* 
LVRt-1<0.X* 
Udebtt-1>$Y 
-  -  -     0.14** 
(0.03) 
   0.16** 
(0.03) 
























Δ Auto Loans / Leases 
($,000s) 
    0.19** 
(0.06) 
   0.22** 
(0.07) 
   0.22** 
(0.07) 
    0.21** 
(0.07) 
   0.21** 
(0.07) 
Change in L.F. Status 































































































Notes to Table 7: Additional control variables: household income squared, household assets squared, value of assets 
and auto loans in t-1 age squared, years schooling, degree, smoker, predicted probability of being a non-mover. 4143 
observations of household-changes (1999-2001, 2001-2003, 2003-2005). IV estimates using change in state-level 
house price index as instrument for change in self-reported house value. t-1 refers to variable measured at beginning of 




Table 8: Growth in House Prices and Indebtedness, PSID and BHPS Households 
  PSID BHPS 
LVR at beginning of period  LVR>0.69 LVR<0.7 LVR>0.69 LVR<0.7 
      
Sample Split      
% total sample  27%  73%  26%  74% 
N household-year observations  1119  3024  602  1714 
N unique households  373  1008  257  901 
        
Beginning of Period      
Age 37.2  47.8  36.4  50.1 
Income ($,£)  62,400  97,100  27,100  38,200 
Networth incl. housing ($,£)  64,600  278,200  17,000  74,000 
        
Changes Over Following Period      
Δ house value ($,£)  27,700  46,400  60,100  103,300 
Δ mortgage debt ($,£)  18,800  -2,500  5,000  -6,100 
Δ unsecured debt ($,£)  1,100  100  1,000  2,100 
Δ family income ($,£)  7,900  4,300  8,200  7,100 
Δ auto loan debt ($,£)  3,700  -500  -  - 
Refinanced mortgage loan (%)  0.51  0.15  0.31  0.21 
        
Notes to Table 8: PSID Sample: 4143 observations for 1381 non-moving households observed in 1999, 2001 and 
2003. Changes are between 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005. BHPS Sample: 2316 observations for 1158 non-
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